On the timing of vertical relationships
AbstractIn a real option model, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but incertain demand, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a lerner-type index, and we show how market growth rate and volatility affect the extent of the distortion. If the initial market demand is high, greater volatility increases the effective investment cost and results in lower value for both firms. Vertical restraints can restore efficiency. For instance, the upstream firm can induce entry at the correct investment threshold by selling a call option on the input. Otherwise, if two downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells the input to the first investor at a discount which is chosen in such a way that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical distortion, and this leader invests at the optimal time.
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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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investment timing; preemption; real options; vertical relations;
Other versions of this item:
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2011. "On the timing of vertical relationships," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de ThÃ©orie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), UniversitÃ© Lyon 2, Ecole Normale SupÃ©rieure 1118, Groupe d'Analyse et de ThÃ©orie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), UniversitÃ© Lyon 2, Ecole Normale SupÃ©rieure.
- Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2010. "On the Timing of Vertical Relationships," IDEI Working Papers 627, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 11 Apr 2011.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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