Why royalties ? Evidence from French distribution networks
AbstractThis empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships in distribution networks. In the framework of agency theory, I study the royalty rate as an incentive device for the upstream firm in maintaining brand-name value, using recent French data to estimate probit models. The results are consistent with the analytical framework.
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Date of creation: 2011
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Vertical Relationships; Distribution Networks; Contract Design; Two-sided moral hazard;
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