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Une analyse de la présence d'administrateurs indépendants au sein du conseil d'administration : contrôle ou conseil ?

Author

Listed:
  • Fatma Tifafi

    (CRIFP - Centre de Recherche en Ingénierie Financière et Finances Publiques - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019))

  • Dominique Dufour

    (CRIFP - Centre de Recherche en Ingénierie Financière et Finances Publiques - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019))

Abstract

Le Conseil d'administration (CA) est au cœur des processus de gouvernement d'entreprise. Nous nous intéressons dans ce travail aux déterminants de la présence d'administrateurs indépendants. Cette étude est conduite sur un échantillon d'entreprises technologiques introduites sur le nouveau marché entre 1999 et 2001. Ce travail permet de mettre en évidence la présence de deux conceptions du rôle du Conseil d'administration : la première privilégie le contrôle et la seconde le conseil.

Suggested Citation

  • Fatma Tifafi & Dominique Dufour, 2006. "Une analyse de la présence d'administrateurs indépendants au sein du conseil d'administration : contrôle ou conseil ?," Post-Print halshs-00558255, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00558255
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00558255
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    References listed on IDEAS

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