La politique de dividende permet-elle de discipliner les dirigeants ?
Abstract
Depuis près de 25 ans, la théorie de l'agence (Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986) postule que les actionnaires demandent des dividendes pour discipliner les dirigeants. Une analyse approfondie de la littérature montre cependant que la politique de dividende ne constitue pas un mécanisme efficace de gouvernance, pour au moins trois raisons : les attentes des divers groupes d'actionnaires sont variées en matière de versement de dividendes ; les entreprises concernées présentent des caractéristiques spécifiques ; la gouvernance des entreprises est de " faible " qualité du point de vue des actionnaires minoritairesDownload Info
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00534746.Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00534746
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00534746/en/
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Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Related research
Keywords: Dividendes ; Fiscalité ; Asymétrie d'information ; Biais comportementaux ; Opportunités d'investissement - Gouvernance - Parties prenantes;Other versions of this item:
- Michel Albouy & Alain Schatt, 2010. "La politique de dividende permet-elle de discipliner les dirigeants?," Working Papers FARGO 1100603, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2010-11-20 (Corporate Finance)
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Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Mohamed Ali AZOUZI & Anis JARBOUI, 2012. "Ceo Emotional Bias And Capital Structure Choice. Bayesian Network Method," Business Excellence and Management, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2(2), pages 47-70, June.
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