Charles Yuji Horioka (Institute of Social and Economic Research - Osaka University) Shizuka Sekita (JSPS - Japan Society for the Promotion of Science - Japan Society for the Promotion of Science)
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We analyze the effect of the degree of judicial enforcement on the probability of credit constraints, the amount of loan and the probability of default. Contrary to the traditional view on judicial efficiency of credit market, our estimation results show that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being rationed and decreases credit granted by banks, consistent with laziness effects. In order to confirm the laziness effect more directly, we analyzed the effect of the degree of judicial enforcement on the probability of default and found that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of default, as expected.
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number
halshs-00407674_v1.
Length: Date of creation: 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00407674_v1
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