This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Public Transit Capacity and Users' Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Laurent Denant-Boèmont () (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes I - Université de Caen)
Sabrina Hammiche (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes I - Université de Caen)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacitycan cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfarefor transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entrygame (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimizecapacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacitycompared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe theDowns-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causesshift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary isnot true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is incontradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen byoperator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signi cantly higher than those predictedby our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry ratewhile capacity has been chosen by operator.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/40/62/23/PDF/paper_downsthomson_experiment_kuhmo-nectar.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00406223_v1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published - Presented, 4th Kuhmo-Nectar Conference “transport and urban economics”, 2009, copenhagen, Denmark
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00406223_v1

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00406223/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (CCSD).

Related research
Keywords: traffic equilibrium; congestion; market entry game; coordination; experimental economics;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Erev, Ido & Rapoport, Amnon, 1998. "Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 146-175, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 31-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Selten, R. & Chmura, T. & Pitz, T. & Kube, S. & Schreckenberg, M., 2007. "Commuters route choice behaviour," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 394-406, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 1990. "On the existence of equilibrium points in a class of asymmetric market entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 239-246, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kene Boun My & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Frédéric Koessler & Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information: An Experimental Investigation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-20, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.