Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good:Experimental evidence
AbstractWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to update upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is financed more frequently when its cost is low relative to the social ability to pay.
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Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Economics Bulletin, 2008, 3, 23, pp. 1-11
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Public Goods; Experiments; Voluntary contributions; Dynamic contributions;
Other versions of this item:
- Pavel Diev & Walid Hichri, 2008. "Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good: Experimental evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11.
- Diev, P. & Hichri, W., 2008. "Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good: Experimental evidence," Working papers 214, Banque de France.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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