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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

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Author Info
Tor Eriksson () (Department of economics - University of Aarhus)
Anders Poulsen (School of economics - University of East Anglia)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)

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Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and frontrunners do not slack off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers’ work.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00276396_v1.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00276396_v1

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Related research
Keywords: evaluation ; feedback ; information ; laboratory experiments ; peer effects ; performance pay ; piece rate ; tournament;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Alessandro Lizzeri & Margaret A. Meyer & Nicola Persico, 2002. "The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations," Penn CARESS Working Papers 592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c0, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daniel Léonard & Ngo Van Long, 2008. "Is Emulation Good for You? The Ups and Downs of Rivalry," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-02, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Peers at Work," IZA Discussion Papers 2292, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(3), pages 917-962, August.
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  6. Jonathan Guryan & Kory Kroft & Matt Notowidigdo, 2007. "Peer Effects in the Workplace: Evidence from Random Groupings in Professional Golf Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 13422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2007. "Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(3), pages 1067-1101, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2006. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001229, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2003. "Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure," Natural Field Experiments 0046, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007. "Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 3200, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Muller, W. & Schotter, A., 2003. "Workaholics and drop outs in optimal organizations," Discussion Paper 43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Thomas J. Dohmen, 2005. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1905, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  15. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1992. "Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 511-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2009. "The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback Information: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students," CEP Discussion Papers dp0915, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Randolph Sloof & C. Mirjam van Praag, 2008. "The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-074/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2009. "The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback Information: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students," Economics Working Papers 1148, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jason M. Lindo & Nicholas J. Sanders & Philip Oreopoulos, 2008. "Ability, Gender, and Performance Standards: Evidence from Academic Probation," NBER Working Papers 14261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kuhnen, Camelia M. & Tymula, Agnieszka, 2008. "Rank expectations, feedback and social hierarchies," MPRA Paper 13428, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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