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Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées

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Author Info
Mouez Fodha () (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - CNRS : UMR8594 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)

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Abstract

Cet article analyse les politiques fiscales à mettre en œuvre afin de lutter contre une externalité de pollution. Nous considérons un modèle à générations imbriquées où seul l’État mène une activité de maintenance de l’environnement, financée par le prélèvement de taxes. L’équilibre concurrentiel est sous-optimal puisque l’économie est confrontée (i) à un problème de fourniture du bien public qu’est la maintenance, (ii) à une externalité de pollution induite par la consommation, (iii) à l’égoïsme des individus à courte durée de vie. Nous déterminons la structure fiscale telle que l’optimum et l’équilibre concurrentiel coïncident. Nous retrouvons alors la règle de Samuelson, modifiée afin d’intégrer un taux d’actualisation social pertinent, incorporant le taux d’assimilation naturelle de la pollution. Par ailleurs, l’intervention publique ne peut se limiter à neutraliser les flux de polluants : cette activité publique doit prendre en compte, outre une composante de dépollution, une composante optimale d’entretien.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00275107_v1.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 2005, 71, 4, 413-425
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00275107_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Taxe environnementale - modèle à générations imbriquées - règle d’or modifiée.

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John, A. & Pecchenino, R. & Schimmelpfennig, D. & Schreft, S., 1995. "Short-lived agents and the long-lived environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 127-141, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bovenberg, A. L. & van der Ploeg, F., 1994. "Environmental policy, public finance and the labour market in a second-best world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 349-390, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. John, A & Pecchenino, R, 1994. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Growth and the Environment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1393-1410, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marini Giancarlo & Scaramozzino Pasquale, 1995. "Overlapping Generations and Environmental Control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 64-77, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ono, Tetsuo, 1996. "Optimal tax schemes and the environmental externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 283-289, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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