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Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?

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Author Info
Claude Meidinger (TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - CNRS : UMR8059 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)

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Abstract

How does leadership work in teams? In this paper, leadership is grounded on both the possession of a private information by the leader and by her ability to communicate credibly with followers in order to induce them to expand high efforts. This paper reports an experiment testing the efficiency of two costly communication devices introduced by Hermalin (1998): leading-by-example and leading-by-sacrifice. In leading-by-example, the leader’s effort is observable by the follower. Experimental evidence shows that leadership works more through reciprocity than through signaling. In leading-by-sacrifice, the leader can give up a part of her payoff. Experimental evidence indicates that this sacrifice works as a truthful signaling device when it is lost for the follower but not when it is transferred to him.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00178474_v1.

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Date of creation: Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178474_v1

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Keywords: experimental economics leadership reciprocity signaling work teams

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
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  2. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Leadership: A Coordination Theory," DRUID Working Papers 99-3, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 757-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Heijden, Eline van der, 2005. "Hierarchy and opportunism in teams," Discussion Paper 109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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