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Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence

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Author Info
Emrah Arbak (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines, IZA - Institute for the study of labor - IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor)

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Abstract

In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our subjects volunteer to lead. Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of non-pecuniary nature. The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing certain attributes of a subject’s teammates has an impact on her decision to lead. Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00175064_v1.

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Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175064_v1

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Related research
Keywords: leadership; endogenous selection; influence; voluntary contribution; experiment;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Guth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Sutter, Matthias & van der Heijden, Eline, 2007. "Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1023-1042, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Duncan, Brian, 2004. "A theory of impact philanthropy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 2159-2180, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2006. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 443-456, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Moxnes, E. & Heijden, E. van der, 2000. "The effect of leadership in a public bad experiment," Discussion Paper 102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, 2006. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 2011, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A, 1996. "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1019-28, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2002. "To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 240-264, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Vesterlund, Lise, 2003. "The informational value of sequential fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 627-657, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," Public Economics 9401003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Nicholas Bardsley & Peter Moffatt, 2005. "The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions," Discussion Papers 2005-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Harbaugh, William T., 1998. "What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 269-284, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lise Vesterlund & Cagri Kumru, 2005. "The Effects of Status on Voluntary Contribution," Working Papers 266, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  16. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Pedro Rey Biel & Steffen Huck, 2005. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Microeconomics 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Arce M, Daniel G, 2001. "Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 114-37, January.
  22. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gary Charness & MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL, 2008. "Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 08-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2009. "Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and in the Laboratory," Post-Print halshs-00371984_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000099, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers," Discussion Papers in Economics 1202, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Endogenous Move Structure And Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: Theory And Experiment," Discussion Papers 2009-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Institution design in social dilemmas: How to design if you must?," MPRA Paper 16922, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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