This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Claude Montmarquette (Université de Montréal - Département de Sciences Economique - Université de Montréal)
Jean-Louis Rullière () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor - Institute for the Study of Labor IZA)
Romain Zeiliger (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number
halshs-00175004_v1.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175004_v1Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00175004/en/Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (CCSD).
Keywords: executive and team-based compensation ; subject pool effects ; real effort experiment ; incentives ; sorting ; mergers ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004.
"Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1057, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2003.
"Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2003s-69, CIRANO.
[Downloadable!] Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004.
"Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students ,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
0070, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!] References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987.
"Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dickinson, David L, 1999.
"An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 638-70, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sillamaa, M. A., 1999.
"How work effort responds to wage taxation: An experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-134, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004.
"Field Experiments ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002.
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, .
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002.
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002.
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Ernst Fehr, 2003.
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives ,"
Microeconomics
0305010, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002.
"Psychological foundations of incentives ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Carpenter, Jeffrey & Burks, Stephen & Verhoogen, Eric, 2004.
"Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003.
"Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? ,"
Experimental Economics ,
Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Edward P. Lazear, 2000.
"Performance Pay and Productivity ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
van Dijk, Frans & Sonnemans, Joep & van Winden, Frans, 2001.
"Incentive systems in a real effort experiment ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 187-214, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989.
"A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-15, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997.
"Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: David J. Cooper et al., 1999.
"Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schotter, A., 1996.
"Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups ,"
Working Papers
96-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel & Wei Lo, 1999.
"Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers ,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
0034, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!]
Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
732, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, .
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp144, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
Natural Field Experiments
0046, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Wallace, Nancy E., 2001.
"Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and loan industry ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-170, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000.
" Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods ,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003.
"Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Canice Prendergast, 1999.
"The Provision of Incentives in Firms ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004.
"The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: R. Lynn Hannan & John H. Kagel & Donald V. Moser, 2002.
"Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 923-951, October.
[Downloadable!]
Croson, Rachel T. A., 1996.
"Partners and strangers revisited ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 25-32, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Working Papers
0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00180112_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00175010_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Working Papers
05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
[Downloadable!] Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1222, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Simon Gaechter & Georg von Krogh & Stefan Haefliger, 2006.
"Private-Collective Innovation and the Fragility of Knowledge Sharing ,"
Discussion Papers
2006-21, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
[Downloadable!]
Waichmann, Israel & Requate, Tilman & Siang, Ch'ng Kean, 2008.
"Managers and Students Playing Cournot: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia ,"
Economics Working Papers
2008,19, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Over 1000 institutions contribute their bibliographic data directly to this service.
This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .