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Fiscal Federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model

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Author Info
Amélie Barbier-Gauchard () (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - CNRS : UMR6221 - Université d'Orléans)
Abstract

What is the optimal wat to stabilize shocks and to take care of fiscal discipline in a fiscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for the fiscal discipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves significantly the union\'s social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the output gap and correct national preferences.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00007797_v1.

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Date of creation: 25 Oct 2005
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Publication status: Published, Economics Bulletin, 2005, 5, 11, 1-8
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00007797_v1

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Keywords: Inter-countries insurance ; stabilization ; fiscal discipline ; EU ; fiscal federalism ; selection adverse;

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  1. Hammond, George & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks. An Empirical Study for the European Community," CEPR Discussion Papers 1170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. van Aarle, Bas & Huart, Florence, 1999. "Monetary and fiscal unification in the EU: a stylized analysis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 49-66, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Van Der Ploeg, F., 1990. "Macroeconomic Policy Coordination During The Various Phases Of Economic And Monetary Integration In Europe," Papers 9061, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  4. Aarle, B. van & Jensen, S.E.H., 1996. "Output stabilization in EMU : is there a case for an EFTS?," Discussion Paper 77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Aarle, Bas Van, 2001. "Stabilizing Macroeconomic Fluctuations In The Emu," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(01), pages 56-80, February. [Downloadable!]
  6. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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