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Household bargaining, spouses'consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes

Author

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  • Helmuth Cremer

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Kerstin Roeder

    (Universität Augsburg [Augsburg])

Abstract

We study optimal commodity taxes under household bargaining. We focus on the taxation of ‘female' and ‘male' products. The expressions for the tax rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. When the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the ‘female good', and a taxation of the ‘male good'. The incentive term depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. When the bargaining weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good will be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Kerstin Roeder, 2021. "Household bargaining, spouses'consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes," Post-Print hal-03169803, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03169803
    DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpz060
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03169803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2012. "Income taxation of couples and the tax unit choice," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 763-778, January.
    2. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, March.
    3. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, 2002. "Externalities and Optimal Taxation," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 14, pages 210-232, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    7. Craig Brett, 2007. "Optimal nonlinear taxes for families," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 225-261, June.
    8. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 2015. "Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem in the presence of a household production sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 91-95.
    9. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Maldonado, Dario & Roeder, Kerstin, 2016. "Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 454-470.
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    15. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
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    19. Immervoll, Herwig & Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen & Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Verdelin, Nicolaj, 2011. "Optimal tax and transfer programs for couples with extensive labor supply responses," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1485-1500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takuya Obara & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2020. "Optimal Taxation in an Endogenous Fertility Model with Non-Cooperative Couples," Discussion Paper Series 211, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2021.
    2. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru & Ogawa, Yoshitomo, 2019. "Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 384-393.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Couples' taxation; Household bargaining; Optimal commodity taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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