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Les AOC sont-elles des clubs ? Réflexions sur les conditions de l'action collective localisée, entre coopération et règles formelles

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  • André Torre

    (SADAPT - Systèmes Agraires Développement : Activités, Produits, Territoires - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - INA P-G - Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon)

Abstract

L'objectif de cet article est de participer à la réflexion sur les Appellations d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC), de montrer qu'elles peuvent faire l'objet d'une analyse de nature économique et plus particulièrement d'apporter des éléments de compréhension des modes d'organisation qui prévalent au sein de ces systèmes de production. Après avoir procédé, dans un premier temps, à des rappels concernant les caractéristiques principales des biens clubs et des AOC (I), nous montrons que cette forme d'organisation locale est justiciable d'une analyse en termes de biens clubs, que l'on raisonne en termes d'attributs ou de modélisation (II), avant d'analyser les problèmes internes de coordination qui se font jour au sein de ces groupes, des problèmes qui trouvent leur solution par la mise en oeuvre d'outils de coordination tels que contrats et dispositifs de gouvernance, ainsi que par le recours à la confiance organisationnelle, socle de l'organisation collective de producteurs (III). Ce dernier travail est réalisé à partir d'un cas appliqué, celui de la fabrication de fromage de Comté.

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  • André Torre, 2002. "Les AOC sont-elles des clubs ? Réflexions sur les conditions de l'action collective localisée, entre coopération et règles formelles," Post-Print hal-02680875, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02680875
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacques Calvet, 2005. "Les clusters vitivinicoles français à AOC. Une analyse en termes de biens clubs," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, vol. 0(4), pages 481-506.
    2. Biénabe, Estelle & Marie-Vivien, Delphine, 2017. "Institutionalizing Geographical Indications in Southern Countries: Lessons Learned from Basmati and Rooibos," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 58-67.
    3. Pham, Hai-Vu, 2010. "La dimension conflictuelle des projets d’infrastructure : essais sur la décision publique, le contentieux et les prix immobiliers," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5656 edited by Torre, André & Kirat, Thierry.

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