IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01528402.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Voluntary information disclosure and sell-side analyst coverage intensity

Author

Listed:
  • Hamrouni Amal

    (GEREM - Groupe d 'Etudes et de Recherche en Economie et Management - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ramzi Benkraiem

    (Audencia Business School)

  • Karmani Majdi

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate whether a high level of voluntary disclosure attracts sell-side analysts. In other words, the authors check whether the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary information that corporate managers provide in annual reports. Design/methodology/approach – The paper relies on regression analyses to study the relationship between the level of coverage by sell-side analysts and the extent of voluntary disclosure for a sample of 155 non-financial firms listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange and members of the SBF 250 index. Findings – The empirical results show that the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the authors conclude that analysts are interested in the volume of information provided voluntarily by corporate managers. Their interest varies across the voluntary-information categories (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) disclosed in annual reports. Originality/value – This study extends previous research by investigating sell-side analysts' preferences in terms of voluntary-information categories in annual reports. A better understanding of the effects of sub-categories of voluntary information is useful to corporate managers wishing to meet market expectations and attract sell-side analysts. In fact, the authors verify how each category of disclosed information (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) affects the analyst coverage intensity. In addition, the authors apply our study in the rather interesting empirical setting that is France, which is characterized by a low investor protection and a large number of active analysts.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamrouni Amal & Ramzi Benkraiem & Karmani Majdi, 2017. "Voluntary information disclosure and sell-side analyst coverage intensity," Post-Print hal-01528402, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01528402
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hou, Jianlei & Zhao, Shangmei & Yang, Haijun, 2020. "Individual analysts, stock return synchronicity and information efficiency," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin & Ameen Qasem & Norhani Aripin & Mohd Shazwan Mohd Ariffin, 2021. "Corporate Responsibility Disclosure, Information Environment and Analysts’ Recommendations: Evidence from Malaysia," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-27, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Annual reports; Voluntary disclosure; Sell-side analysts; Voluntary-information categories;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01528402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.