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Responsabilité sociale d'une entreprise publique : une formalisation du jeu des acteurs

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  • Myriam Donsimoni

    ()
    (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I)

  • Daniel Labaronne

    (Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV : EA2954)

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    Abstract

    Nous étudions le comportement de managers d'une entreprise publique, l'Office Chérifien des Phosphates, et d'élus locaux engagés dans une relation de RSE. Quels sont les fondements théoriques de ce type de relation et les stratégies de ces acteurs ? Nous formalisons, à partir de la théorie des jeux, l'influence des managers de l'OCP sur l'action des élus. Cette influence s'exerce soit par la coopération, soit par le contrôle. Elle peut déboucher sur de l'asymétrie informationnelle générée par les élus. Nous examinons l'attitude des managers de l'OCP confrontés à cette situation biaisée pour en tirer des enseignements managériaux.

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    File URL: http://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/docs/00/97/26/49/PDF/RSE_de_l_OCP_-_jeu_des_acteurs.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00972649.

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    Date of creation: 2014
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    Publication status: Published, Management International Review, 2014, Volume 18, Numéro 2, Pages 22-38
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00972649

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-00972649
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    Keywords: responsabilité sociale (M14) ; théorie des jeux (C7) ; gouvernance d'entreprise (G34) ; comportement des entreprises (D21) ; information privée et asymétrique (D 82);

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    1. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2010. "Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility," Working Papers 2010.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "Le rôle de la confiance dans le système de gouvernance des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0980501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    5. Quairel, Françoise & Auberger, Marie Noëlle, 2005. "Management responsable et PME : une relecture du concept de « responsabilité sociétale de l'entreprise"," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1379, Paris Dauphine University.
    6. Fabienne Boudier & Faouzi Bensebaa, 2008. "Responsabilité sociale des firmes multinationales : faut-il être propriétaire pour être responsable ?," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 27-44.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 123-56, Supplemen.
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