A model of scholarly publishing with hybrid academic journals
AbstractIn April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might use publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors and readers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house will choose the open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals' accessibility - quality profiles.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00971541.
Date of creation: Mar 2014
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00971541
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Academic publishing ; Open access ; Knowledge di¤usion ; Imperfect information ; Signaling;
Other versions of this item:
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2014. "A model of scholarly publishing with hybrid academic journals," ESSEC Working Papers WP1406, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2014-04-11 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
- NEP-NET-2014-04-11 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2014-04-11 (Sociology of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007.
"The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective,"
Economics Working Papers
1025, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2009.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2010. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 222-55, May.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," TSE Working Papers 09-098, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," IDEI Working Papers 458, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "Open Access and Academic Journal Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 453-459, May.
- Gaulé, Patrick & Maystre, Nicolas, 2011.
"Getting cited: Does open access help?,"
Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1332-1338.
- Patrick Gaulé & Nicolas Maystre, 2008. "Getting cited: does open access help?," CEMI Working Papers cemi-workingpaper-2008-00, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006.
"Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale,"
ESSEC Working Papers
DR 06003, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1248-1265, June.
- Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "The Bundling of Academic Journals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 441-446, May.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- McCabe Mark J & Snyder Christopher M., 2007. "Academic Journal Prices in a Digital Age: A Two-Sided Market Model," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, January.
- Aviv Nevo & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Mark McCabe, 2005. "Academic Journal Pricing and the Demand of Libraries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 447-452, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.