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A model of scholarly publishing with hybrid academic journals

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  • Damien Besancenot

    ()
    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - CNRS : UMR7234 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC))

  • Radu Vranceanu

    ()
    (Economics Department - ESSEC Business School)

Abstract

In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might use publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors and readers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house will choose the open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals' accessibility - quality profiles.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00971541.

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Date of creation: Mar 2014
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00971541

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00971541
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Related research

Keywords: Academic publishing ; Open access ; Knowledge di¤usion ; Imperfect information ; Signaling;

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  1. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06003, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  2. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective," Economics Working Papers 1025, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2009.
  3. McCabe Mark J & Snyder Christopher M., 2007. "Academic Journal Prices in a Digital Age: A Two-Sided Market Model," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, January.
  4. Aviv Nevo & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Mark McCabe, 2005. "Academic Journal Pricing and the Demand of Libraries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 447-452, May.
  5. Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "Open Access and Academic Journal Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 453-459, May.
  6. Gaulé, Patrick & Maystre, Nicolas, 2011. "Getting cited: Does open access help?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1332-1338.
    • Patrick Gaulé & Nicolas Maystre, 2008. "Getting cited: does open access help?," CEMI Working Papers cemi-workingpaper-2008-00, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation.
  7. Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "The Bundling of Academic Journals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 441-446, May.
  8. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
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