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Inertie De La Politique Monétaire Dans La Zone Euro : Le Rôle De L'Hétérogénéité

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Author Info

  • Christian Aubin

    ()
    (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers)

  • Ibrahima Diouf

    ()
    (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers)

  • Dominique Pepin

    ()
    (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers)

Abstract

Cet article analyse l'inertie de la politique monétaire à partir d'une approche privilégiant les préférences des banquiers centraux dans une logique de comportement bureaucratique, compte tenu des contraintes du cadre institutionnel de l'Eurosystème. L'hétérogénéité des conjonctures au sein de la zone accroît la probabilité du statu quo dans un processus de décision collégiale privilégiant les solutions de consensus. L'estimation d'un modèle Probit montre que l'inertie observée dans la politique monétaire unique est affectée par la diversité des taux de croissance réelle des pays membres. This paper analyses the monetary policy inertia from an approach focusing on central bankers' preferences in a logic of bureaucratic behaviour, considering constraints of the institutional framework of the Eurosystem. The heterogeneity of business cycles in the area increases the probability of statu quo in a collective decision process favouring consensus. The estimation of a Probit model shows that the inertia observed in the single monetary policy is influenced by the diversity of member states' real growth rates.

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File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/96/00/30/PDF/Inertie_de_la_politique_monetaire_dans_la_zone_euro_le_role_de_l_heterogeneite.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00960030.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Publication status: Published, Economies et sociétés, série Monnaie (ME), 2010, 44, 6, 831-860
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00960030

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00960030
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Related research

Keywords: politique monétaire ; Eurosystème ; changement de taux directeur ; gradualisme;

References

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