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Un modèle théorique d'intermédiation : transmission et gestion des chocs

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    ()
    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - Université Sud Toulon Var)

Abstract

Nous proposons un modèle théorique simple comportant, d'une part, une économie caractérisée par un modèle d'intermédiation donné, défini par l'importance des portefeuilles de crédits aux ménages dans les bilans des banques et dans l'encours total de crédit ; et d'autre part, une banque centrale caractérisée par une règle de politique monétaire alliant politique de taux d'intérêts sous forme de règle de type Taylor augmentée, injections de liquidités, et achats de titres. Nous montrons que le modèle d'intermédiation détermine les conditions de transmission d'un choc sur un segment de marché déterminé. Il en résulte deux principaux éléments de conclusion. D'abord, l'importance accordée par les banques centrales à l'écart de production dans le cadre d'une règle de Taylor influe de fait sur la stabilité financière, pour un modèle d'intermédiation donné. Ensuite, la manière dont le risque de taux est partagé entre banques et emprunteurs détermine les modalités de la politique monétaire. S'il est supporté en proportion excessive par les emprunteurs, tout choc positif de taux directeur peut dégrader les conditions de financement au point de conduire la banque centrale à mobiliser l'éventail complet des instruments de politique monétaire.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00806524.

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Date of creation: 10 Apr 2013
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Publication status: Published - Presented, Atelier de travail "Retour à la stabilité financière", GDRE Monnaie Banque Finance, 2013, Paris, France
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00806524

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Keywords: Modèle d'intermédiation; crédits aux ménages; Banques centrales; amplification des chocs financiers;

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