Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource
AbstractWe present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk- averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00725181.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published - Presented, NETWORKING 2012 - 11th IFIP Networking Conference, 2012, Prague, Czech Republic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725181
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Game theory; Wireless networks; Pricing; Shared spectrum;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-09-03 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Patrick MAILLÉ & Bruno Tuffin, 2011. "Competition among providers in loss networks," Post-Print hal-00724665, HAL.
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