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Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource

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Author Info

  • Patrick Maillé

    ()
    (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - Institut Mines-Télécom - Télécom Bretagne - Université Européenne de Bretagne (UEB))

  • Bruno Tuffin

    (INRIA - IRISA - DIONYSOS - INRIA - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS : UMR6074)

  • Jean-Marc Vigne

    ()
    (INRIA - IRISA - DIONYSOS - INRIA - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS : UMR6074)

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    Abstract

    We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk- averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.

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    File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/72/51/81/PDF/maille2012competition_jmv.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00725181.

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    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published - Presented, NETWORKING 2012 - 11th IFIP Networking Conference, 2012, Prague, Czech Republic
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725181

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725181
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    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: Game theory; Wireless networks; Pricing; Shared spectrum;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Patrick MAILLÉ & Bruno Tuffin, 2011. "Competition among providers in loss networks," Post-Print hal-00724665, HAL.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
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