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Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings

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  • David Ettinger

    ()
    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)

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    Abstract

    We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00702434.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Publication status: Published, Applied Economics Letters, 2003, 80, 1, 1-7
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00702434

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00702434
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    Related research

    Keywords: Auctions ; Efficiency ; Crossholdings;

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    Cited by:
    1. repec:dgr:uvatin:2009066 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lu, Jingfeng, 2012. "Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 561-575.
    3. Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1473, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2009. "Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-066/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence," ECON - Working Papers 153, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4771, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.

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