Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
AbstractWe study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00702434.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Applied Economics Letters, 2003, 80, 1, 1-7
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Auctions ; Efficiency ; Crossholdings;
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- Ettinger, David, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Open Access publications from UniversitÃ© Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/5431, Université Paris-Dauphine.
- Gopal Das Varma, 2002. "Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 689-708, Winter.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2006.
"Silent interests and all-pay auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 701-713, July.
- Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1473, CESifo Group Munich.
- Konrad, Kai Andreas, 2005. "Silent interests and all-pay auctions," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions," Discussion Papers 2005/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
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