A note on poor-institution traps in international fiscal policy game
AbstractThis note explores the link between the effort level to strengthen institutional quality and the nature of the fiscal policy game among interdependent economies plagued by corruption. Every country has a lower incentive to improve public governance when the effort made abroad to remedy institutional deficiencies becomes weaker. More importantly, the model highlights a possible trade-off between fighting corruption in interrelated developing countries and promoting fiscal policy coordination among them: cooperation goes together with the acceptance of more corruption. It follows that poor-institution traps can be Pareto-improving.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00610540.
Date of creation: 19 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31, 1, pp. 375-387
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00610540/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre Faure, 2011. "A note on poor-institution traps in international fiscal policy games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 375-387.
- F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-29 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008.
"Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
- Toke Aidt & Jayasri Dutta & Vania Sena, 2006. "Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 15_2006, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
- Carsten Hefeker, 2009.
"Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime,"
MAGKS Papers on Economics
200911, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Carsten Hefeker, 2009. "Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime," CESifo Working Paper Series 2561, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2008. "Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime," HWWI Research Papers 2-12, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2008. "Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 17, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.