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Financial Risk Management: When Does Independence Fail?

Author

Listed:
  • Augustin Landier
  • D. Sraer
  • David Thesmar

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Augustin Landier & D. Sraer & David Thesmar, 2009. "Financial Risk Management: When Does Independence Fail?," Post-Print hal-00461112, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00461112
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.2.454
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Opinions as Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 815-860, October.
    2. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Wouter Dessein, 2002. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 811-838.
    4. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    5. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1979. "Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 991-1010, October.
    6. Van den Steen, Eric, 2005. "Too Motivated?," Working papers 18180, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    7. Augustin Landier & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2009. "Optimal Dissent in Organizations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(2), pages 761-794.
    8. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andries, Alin Marius & Brown, Martin, 2014. "Credit Booms and Busts in Emerging Markets: The Role of Bank Governance and Risk Managment," Working Papers on Finance 1414, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    2. Zalina Zainudin & Shaharin Abdul Samad & Rana Altounjy, 2019. "The Determinants Factors of an Effective Risk-Aware Culture of Firms in Implementing and Maintaining Risk Management Program," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 11(5), pages 459-465, August.
    3. Cãtãlina Sitnikov & Claudiu George Bocean & Dorel Berceanu & Ramona Pîrvu, 2017. "Risk Management Model from the Perspective of the Implementing ISO 9001:2015 Standard Within Financial Services Companies," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 19(S11), pages 1017-1017.
    4. Nicoleta BARBUTA-MISU, 2012. "Financial Risk Study of the Construction Sector SMEs," Economics and Applied Informatics, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 3, pages 31-38.
    5. Rene M. Stulz, 2016. "Risk management, governance, culture, and risk taking in banks," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 43-60.
    6. Stulz, Rene M., 2014. "Governance, Risk Management, and Risk-Taking in Banks," Working Papers 14-09, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    7. Mihaela-Cristina Onica & Jalba Silvia & Nedelcu Andreea - Izabela, 2015. "Comparative Analysis Regarding The Study Of The Financial Balance Of Companies Listed On The Stock Market," Risk in Contemporary Economy, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, pages 509-525.
    8. Alin Marius Andries & Martin Brown, 2017. "Credit booms and busts in emerging markets," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(3), pages 377-437, July.
    9. François-Xavier de Vaujany & Vladislav Fomin & Kalle Lyytinen & Stefan Haefliger, 2013. "Sociomaterial regulation in organizations: The case of information technology," Post-Print hal-01648122, HAL.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13054 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. He, Ying & Chen, Cindy & Hu, Yue, 2019. "Managerial overconfidence, internal financing, and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 501-510.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial risk management; Independence;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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