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L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Rious

    (E3S - Supélec Sciences des Systèmes - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

  • Jean-Michel Glachant

    (LdP - Loyola de Palacio Programme - EUI - European University Institute)

  • Yannick Perez

    (LdP - Loyola de Palacio Programme - EUI - European University Institute, ADIS - Analyse des Dynamiques Industrielles et Sociales - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - Département d'Economie)

  • Philippe Dessante

    (E3S - Supélec Sciences des Systèmes - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

Abstract

This paper analyses how the long run coordination between generation and transmission is organized in a liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis framework in order to split in disctinct modules the coordination mechanisms between generation and transmission of electricity. The governance structure of the power transmission grid completes this analysis framework. Then, we show that, in a logic of institutionnal complementarity, this governance structure influences the power flow management schemes that are effectively implemented by the power Transmission and System Operators. Although the locational signals are necessary to guide the location of new power plants, the locational constraints of generators and the governance structure of the network then explain that these signals are insufficient to coordinate generation and transmission to the long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Rious & Jean-Michel Glachant & Yannick Perez & Philippe Dessante, 2009. "L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés," Post-Print hal-00422149, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00422149
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://centralesupelec.hal.science/hal-00422149
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    2. Boyce, John R. & Hollis, Aidan, 2005. "Governance of electricity transmission systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 237-255, March.
    3. Barker, Jr.J. & Tenenbaum, B. & Woolf, F., 1997. "Governance and Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators. An International Comparison," Papers 382, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    4. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
    5. Paul Joskow, 2006. "Patterns of Transmission Investments," Chapters, in: François Lévêque (ed.), Competitive Electricity Markets and Sustainability, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rious Vincent & Perez Yannick & Glachant Jean-Michel, 2011. "Power Transmission Network Investment as an Anticipation Problem," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-23, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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