The structure of bank supervision and corruption in lending: a study for transition economies
AbstractThis paper try to examine the relation between the structure of bank supervision and corruption in lending based on the data from 21 transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We support Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2006) that higher supervisory power will increase the degree of corruption in lending while supervisory policies which promote private monitoring by pushing banks to disclose accurate information and give incentives to private agents to monitor bank will reduce the degree of corruption in lending. As the main finding in this paper, we prove that the structure of bank supervision has significant effect to corruption in lending. More specifically, we found that the degree of corruption in lending will increase when the bank supervisor function is not in the central bank. We also have found that after we control our model with various country-level variables, the higher independency of bank supervisor will decrease the degree of corruption in lending.
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Date of creation: 2012
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banques; pratiques déloyales;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-04-06 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-04-06 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2013-04-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-TRA-2013-04-06 (Transition Economics)
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