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L'intérêt d'un renforcement des fonds propres bancaires (et de mesures complémentaires) pour concilier stabilité financière, performance et bon fonctionnement des banques

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  • Arthur Petit-Romec

    (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)

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    Abstract

    Les banques ont entre autres vocations à collecter les dépôts. Ces dépôts représentent leur principale source de financement et jouent un rôle important (à la fois théoriquement et empiriquement) sur leur bon fonctionnement. Il semble donc normal que les banques aient un niveau de levier relativement élevé. Néanmoins, le fort levier des banques génère des externalités négatives pour l'ensemble de l'économie. Ainsi, des exigences plus élevées en fonds propres seraient une réponse adéquate aux problèmes de liquidations d'actifs, à la réticence des banques à lever du capital en temps de crise, aux incitations à prendre des risques résultant des garanties des États, à la hausse de la compétition et au changement de rôle des banques. Un renforcement des fonds propres bancaires permettrait donc d'améliorer la stabilité du secteur financier. Cette stabilité serait bénéfique pour l'ensemble de l'économie et ne serait pas obtenue au prix d'une baisse de valeur, d'efficacité ou de performance des banques. En effet, un renforcement des fonds propres bancaires ne devrait pas affecter négativement la valeur des banques, leur bonne gouvernance, leur distribution de crédits ou leur création de liquidité. De plus, le capital contribue à améliorer la performance et la probabilité de survie des banques en temps de crise. Malgré les effets bénéfiques d'une plus forte capitalisation, les banques semblent réticentes à augmenter leurs fonds propres. Cette réticence est notamment liée à l'effet négatif qu'aurait un renforcement des fonds propres sur la discipline des dirigeants. Des mesures complémentaires comme la création d'un compte spécial de capital ou d'actions à responsabilité limitée ont ainsi été proposées pour apporter une solution à ce problème. Enfin, modifier la rémunération des dirigeants de banques, réduire la taille des banques ou mettre en place des augmentations de capital contingentes pourraient diminuer les risques et coûts de faillite des banques.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number dumas-00643745.

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    Date of creation: 30 Jun 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00643745

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