Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Emission trading and labor market rigidity inan international duopoly model

Contents:

Author Info

  • Tarik Tazdaït

    ()
    (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD] : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech)

  • Alejandro Caparros

    (IPP - Institute for Public Goods and Policies - CSIC)

  • Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau

    (OEP - Organisation, Efficacité, Production - CNRS : EA2550)

Abstract

Emission trading systems have been recently proposed in diffrerent regions to reduce polluting emissions (e.g. in the European Union for carbon dioxide). One of the objectives of these systems is to encourage firms to adopt advanced abatement technologies. However permits create an incentive to reduce production, which may be seen as negative by policy makers. Combining the emission trading systemwith a more rigid labour market, we show conditions under which it is possible to avoid this impact keeping the incentives to improve abatement technologies. The analysis is done for oligopolistic firms engagedin international rivalry.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/27/12/22/PDF/RIE-Preprint.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series CIRED Working Papers with number halshs-00271222.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 20 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-00271222

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00271222
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: emission trading; labor market; international rivalry;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Parry, Ian W. H. & Williams, Roberton III & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1999. "When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 52-84, January.
  2. Jaffe, Adam B. & Newell, Richard G. & Stavins, Robert N., 2003. "Chapter 11 Technological change and the environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics, Elsevier, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 461-516 Elsevier.
  3. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, 1994. "Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses," NBER Working Papers 4897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Requate, Till & Unold, Wolfram, 2003. "Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 125-146, February.
  5. Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Permits, Standards, and Technology Innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 23-44, July.
  6. Werner Antweiler & Daniel Trefler, 2000. "Increasing Returns and All That: A View From Trade," NBER Working Papers 7941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Gielen, Dolf & Moriguchi, Yuichi, 2002. "CO2 in the iron and steel industry: an analysis of Japanese emission reduction potentials," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(10), pages 849-863, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-00271222. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.