We suscribe to an account of framing-effects in decision theory in terms of an inference to a background informationa by the hearer when a speaker uses a certain frame while other equivalent frames were also available. This account was sketched by Craig McKenzie. We embed it in Bolker-Jeffrey decision model (or logic of action) - one main reason of this is that this latter model makes preferences bear on propositions. We can deduce a given anomaly or cognitive bias (namely framing-effects) in a formal decision theory. This leads to some philosophical considerations on the relationship between the rationality of preferences and the sensitivity to descriptions or labels of states of affairs (intensionality) in decision-making.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: Date of creation: 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:ijn_00000656_v1
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000656/en/ Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (CCSD).
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: