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On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State

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  • Gaël Giraud

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Myrna Wooders

    ()
    (Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics)

Abstract

We construct a infinite-horizon political game where the production of a public good is delegated to a politician. The politician is controlled by finitely many citizens who, on the other hand, trade commodities and pay taxes on a voluntary basis. We provide conditions in terms of heterogenous beliefs under one single commodity is used both as a universal means of exchange and a means to pay taxes. These provide an analytical framework for the understanding of money as originating both from the private and the public sector simultaneously.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00786075.

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Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00786075

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Keywords: Money; strategic market game; political economy; heterogenous beliefs;

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  1. John Geanakoplos & Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, 1998. "Social Security Money's Worth," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1193, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 619-641, 05.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation," NBER Working Papers 15302, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mertens, J. F., 2003. "The limit-price mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 433-528, July.
  5. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December.
  6. Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1983. "Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 676, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Alvaro Sandroni, 2000. "Do Markets Favor Agents Able to Make Accurate Predicitions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1303-1342, November.
  8. Rabah Amir & Siddhartha Sahi & Martin Shubik, 1986. "A Strategic Market Game with Complete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 814R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 1987.
  9. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2003. "Inside and outside fiat money, gains to trade, and IS-LM," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 347-397, 03.
  10. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C., 2003. "Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 169-175, January.
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