Les Structures De Gouvernances De La Chaine Transactionnelle Du Transport Fluvial De Conteneurs Sur Le Rhone
AbstractThe modal share of container barging in French maritime ports (9% of TEU in Le Havre and 5% in Marseille in 2007) is significantly lower than elsewhere (32% in Rotterdam and 33% in Antwerp). Some reports and studies explain the viscosity of container barging flows as a result of several factors, generally concentrated around the seaport community. In continuation of previous seminal works, this paper adopts a neo-institutional approach (Williamson, 1985; 1996) of container barging to understand how the factors generating this viscosity are managed in the Rhône-Saône river basin. Section 1 describes the characteristics of the transaction of container barge transport. Section 2 deals with observed governance structures (Logirhône and RSC) of this transaction chain in the Rhône-Saône river basin and shows how vertical integration helps to control it. . Section 3 is devoted to the transaction' attributes (asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty) of this chain. It confirms Williamson (1996) remediableness criterion, i.e. that the observed governance structure of a given transaction is presumed efficient and aligned to its attributes. Finally, it shows that the development of container barge transport on the Rhône-Saône basin in France is not impeded by its degree of integration.
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transport fluvial de conteneurs; bassin rhodanien; chaîne transactionnelle; structures de gouvernance;
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