On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium
AbstractIn this paper, we establish the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium for games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge's strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge's strong games are essential.
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Date of creation: Jul 2011
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Nash equilibrium; strong Berge equilibrium; fixed point; essential games.;
Other versions of this item:
- Messaoud Deghdak & Monique Florenzano, 2011. "On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-08-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-08-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Monique Florenzano, 2007.
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Monique Florenzano, 2008. "General equilibrium," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08005, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007.
"On Berge Equilibrium,"
CIRED Working Papers
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- Yong-Hui Zhou & Jian Yu & Shu-Wen Xiang, 2007. "Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 493-503, April.
- Borglin, Anders & Keiding, Hans, 1976. "Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium : A note on the `new' existence theorems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 313-316, December.
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