Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
AbstractThis paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.
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Date of creation: Sep 2010
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Finitely repeated games; semi-standard monitoring; folk theorem.;
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- Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
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