Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Choosing Intellectual Protection: Imitation, Patent Strength and Licensing

Contents:

Author Info

  • David Encaoua

    ()
    (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - CNRS : UMR8594 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Yassine Lefouili

    ()

Abstract

Patents are probabilistic rights. We set up a multi-stage model in which choosing between patent and trade secrecy is affected by three parameters : the patent strength defined as the probability that the right is upheld by the court, the cost of imitating a patented innovation relative to the cost of imitating a secret innovation, and the innovation size defined as the magnitude of the cost reduction. The choice of the protection regime is the result of two effects: the damage effect evaluated under the unjust enrichment doctrine and the effect of market competition that occurs under the shadow of infringement. We find that large innovations are likely to be kept secret whereas small innovations are always patented. Furthermore, medium innovations are patented only when patent strength is sufficiently high. Finally, we investigate a class of patent licensing agreements used to settle patent disputes between patent holders and their competitors.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/49/69/42/PDF/Encaoua-Lefouili_Annales.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00496942.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2005, 79/80, 241-271
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00496942

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00496942
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: probabilistic right; patent strength; innovation size; imitation cost; trade secrecy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
  3. David Encaoua & Abraham Hollander, 2002. "Competition Policy and Innovation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 63-79, Spring.
  4. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 2005. "Probabilistic Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 75-98, Spring.
  5. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00185360 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Encaoua, David & Guellec, Dominique & Martinez, Catalina, 2006. "Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons from economic analysis," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 1423-1440, November.
  7. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
  8. Crampes, Claude, 1986. "Les inconvénients d’un dépôt de brevet pour une entreprise innovatrice," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(4), pages 521-534, décembre.
  9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
  11. James Anton & Hillary Greene & Dennis Yao, 2006. "Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 6, pages 1-26 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Scherer, F. M., 1983. "The propensity to patent," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 107-128, March.
  13. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00177614 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2007. "Finding "Lost" Profits: An Equilibrium Analysis of Patent Infringement Damages," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 186-207, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Heijdra, B.J. & Ligthart, J.E., 2006. "Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition and Finite Lives," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-199395, Tilburg University.
  2. David Encaoua & Dominique Guellec & Catalina Martínez, 2006. "Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL halshs-00177614, HAL.
  3. Bronwyn Hall & Christian Helmers & Mark Rogers & Vania Sena, 2014. "The Choice between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 375-423, June.
  4. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00177614 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00847955 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers & Mark Rogers & Vania Sena, 2012. "The Choice between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Literature Review," NBER Working Papers 17983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bouguezzi, Fehmi & EL ELJ, Moez, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Patent Licensing in Upstream and Downstream Markets," MPRA Paper 22212, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Rabah Amir & David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2013. "Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL halshs-00847955, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00496942. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.