Nicolas Chatelais () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, Institut CDC pour la recherche - Institut CDC pour la recherche) Mathilde Peyrat () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, ESSEC Business School - Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we use panel data and tools from spatial econometrics to examine the role of small countries in tax competition within the enlarged European Union. We find that interactions are stronger among smaller EU countries than between larges ones and rates set in small countries influence those in big countries. Finally, small countries located in the centre of the EU have more influence on tax policies choices of big countries than small countries located in the periphery of EU.
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Length: Date of creation: Oct 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00332479_v1
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