An extension of Reny's theorem without quasiconcavity
AbstractIn a recent but well known paper, Reny has proved the existence of Nash equilibria for compact and quasiconcave games, with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. In this paper, we prove that the quasiconcavity assumption in Reny's theorem can be weakened: roughly, we introduce a measure allowing to localize the lack of quasiconcavity; this allows to refine the analysis of equilibrium existence
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Date of creation: 20 Sep 2008
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Nash equilibrium; existence; discontinuous games; non quasiconcave;
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- Carolyn Pitchik, 1981. "Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 579, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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