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A value for bi-cooperative games

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Author Info
Christophe Labreuche () (UMP CNRS/THALES - Unité mixte de physique CNRS/Thalès - CNRS : UMR137 - THALES)
Michel Grabisch () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)

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Abstract

Bi-cooperative games were introduced by Bilbao et al. as a generalization of TU cooperative games, in which each player can participate positively, negatively, or not at all. In this paper, we propose a definition of a share of the worth obtained by some players after they decided on their participation in the game. It turns out that the cost allocation rule does not look for a given player to her contribution at the opposite participation option to the one she chooses. The relevance of the value is discussed on several examples.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00308738_v1.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Publication status: Published, International Journal of Game Theory / International Journal of Games Theory, 2008, 37, 3, 409-438
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00308738_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Bi-cooperative games - Value - Efficiency;

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  1. Christophe Labreuche & Michel Grabisch, 2006. "Axiomatization of the Shapley value and power index for bi-cooperative games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b06023, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Labreuche, Christophe & Grabisch, Michel, 2006. "Generalized Choquet-like aggregation functions for handling bipolar scales," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 172(3), pages 931-955, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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