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Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first ?

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Author Info
Nicolas Houy () (COE - Institute of Economic Research)
Lucie Ménager () (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - CNRS : UMR8594 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)

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Abstract

Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that if rational agents communicate the value of a function f according to a protocol upon which they have agreed beforehand, they will eventually reach a consensus about the value of f, provided a fairness condition on the protocol and a convexity condition on the function f. In this article, we address the issue of how agents agree on a communication protocol in the case where they communicate in order to learn information. We show that if it is common knowledge among a group of agents that some of them disagree about two protocols, then the consensus value of f must be the same according to the two protocols.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00194365_v1.

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Date of creation: Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00194365_v1

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Related research
Keywords: Common knowledge; consensus; communication protocol.;

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  1. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1998. "Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 151-70, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chamley, Christophe & Gale, Douglas, 1994. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1065-85, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-79, June.
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  10. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
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  11. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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