This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Ownership, Contractual Practices and Technical Efficiency: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
William Roy () (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - CNRS : UMR5593 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat)
Anne Yvrande-Billon (ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of ownership structure and contractual choices on technical efficiency in the French urban public transport sector. The central proposition, which relies on classical contract theory arguments, is that ownership regime and contractual practices are key determinants of performances.To test this proposition, we use an original panel data set covering 135 different French urban transport networks over the period 1995-2002 and we apply a stochastic frontier methodology.The econometric results corroborate our proposition: the technical efficiency of urban public transport operators depends on the ownership regime and on the type of contract governing their transactions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/10/73/75/PDF/JTEP_2061R_a_mettre_en_ligne.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00107375_v1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2007, 41, 2, 257-282
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00107375_v1

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00107375/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (CCSD).

Related research
Keywords: Contracts ; Contractual Incentives ; Contractual arrangements ; Ownership ; Efficiency ; Performance ; Urban Public Transport ; Public Service Governance;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
    Other versions:
  2. Kerstens, K., 1996. "Technical efficiency measurement and explanation of French urban transit companies," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 431-452, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    Other versions:
  5. Battese, G E & Coelli, T J, 1995. "A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 325-32.
  6. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "Incomplete contracts and privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 569-579, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 605-629, Winter.
    Other versions:
  8. William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.