The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari's model, with a function f that transforms frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak) and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the decision maker respects (Ak); (ii) f is a polynomial of degree k; (iii) the weight of all coalitions withmore than k members is equal to zero.
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Length: Date of creation: 2002 Date of revision: Publication status: Published, Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106, 1, 190-200 Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00085888_v1
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Chakravarty, Satya R, 1988.
"Extended Gini Indices of Inequality,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 147-56, February.
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