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Unemployment Insurance, Job Search, and Informal Employment

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  • David Margolis

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Lucas Navarro

    (ILADES - Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

  • David A. Robalino

    (Social Protection and Labor Sector, Human Development Department - The World Bank)

Abstract

This paper analyses the potential impacts of introducing unemployment insurance (UI) in middle income countries using the case of Malaysia, which today does not have such a system. The analysis is based on a job search model with unemployment and three employment sectors: formal and informal wage employment, and self employment. The parameters of the model are estimated to replicate the structure of the labor market in Malaysia in 2009 and the distribution of earnings for informal, formal and self employed workers. The results suggest that unemployment insurance would have only a modest negative effect on unemployment if benefits are not overly generous. The main effect would be a reallocation of labor from wage into self employment while increasing average wages in the formal and informal sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • David Margolis & Lucas Navarro & David A. Robalino, 2014. "Unemployment Insurance, Job Search, and Informal Employment," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00714372, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00714372
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00714372
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vargas Juliana Mesén & Linden Bruno Van der, 2019. "Why Cash Transfer Programs Can Both Stimulate and Slow Down Job Finding," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, June.
    2. Jake Bradley, 2016. "Self-employment in an equilibrium model of the labor market," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-30, December.
    3. Docquier, Frédéric & Iftikhar, Zainab, 2019. "Brain drain, informality and inequality: A search-and-matching model for sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 109-125.
    4. Mesén Vargas, Juliana & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2017. "Is There Always a Trade-off between Insurance and Incentives? The Case of Unemployment with Subsistence Constraints," IZA Discussion Papers 11034, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. World Bank, 2012. "Republic of Lebanon--Good Jobs Needed : The Role of Macro, Investment, Education, Labor and Social Protection Policies," World Bank Publications - Reports 13217, The World Bank Group.
    6. Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet & Mustafa Ulus, 2016. "Unemployment Compensation and the Allocation of Labor in Developing Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 385-416, June.
    7. Esteban-Pretel, Julen & Kitao, Sagiri, 2021. "Labor Market Policies in a Dual Economy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Achkasov, Yu. & Pilnik, P., 2017. "Income Tax Effect on Economic Performance in Terms of Endogenous Choice between Labor and Enterprise Market," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 12-27.
    9. Robalino, David & Weber, Michael, 2016. "Simulations of Labor Policies in Tunisia with a Structural Job-Search Model," Conference papers 332791, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    10. Ghorpade,Yashodhan & Franco Restrepo,Camila & Castellanos Rodriguez,Luis Eduardo, 2024. "Social Protection and Labor Market Policies for the Informally Employed : A Review of Evidence from Low- and Middle-Income Countries," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 188471, The World Bank.
    11. Poschke, Markus, 2019. "Wage Employment, Unemployment and Self-Employment across Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 12367, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Gimpelson, Vladimir & Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav, 2014. "Between Light and Shadow: Informality in the Russian Labour Market," IZA Discussion Papers 8279, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Bosch, Mariano & Esteban-Pretel, Julen, 2015. "The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-17.
    14. Mariano Bosch, 2016. "Does unemployment insurance offer incentives to take jobs in the formal sector?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 300-300, October.
    15. Palacios, Robert & Robalino, David A., 2020. "Integrating Social Insurance and Social Assistance Programs for the Future World of Labor," IZA Discussion Papers 13258, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment insurance; Informal sector; Self employment; Job search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion

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