Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information
AbstractThe most usual procedure when facing decisions in complex settings consists in consulting experts, aggregating the information they provide, and deciding on the basis of this aggregated information. We argue that such a procedure entails a substantial loss, insofar as it precludes the possibility to take into account simultaneously the decision maker's attitude towards conflict among experts and her attitude towards imprecision of information. We propose to consider directly how a decision maker behaves when using information coming from several sources. We give an axiomatic foundation for a decision criterion that allows to distinguish on a behavioral basis the decision maker's attitude towards imprecision and towards conflict.
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Date of creation: 28 Dec 2009
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Decisions with multiple sources of information. Conflict aversion. Imprecision aversion.;
Other versions of this item:
- Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, 2013. "Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 427-452, July.
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