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Critiques de trois arguments justifiant les lois sur le financement de la vie politique

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Author Info
François Facchini () (EDJ - Université de Reims - Champagne Ardenne, LAEP - LAboratoire d'Economie Publique - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
Abstract

Cet article soutient que les lois sur le financement de la vie politique en France sont fondées sur de mauvais arguments. Il soutient que la corruption ne s'explique pas par l'absence de lois sur le financement de la vie politique mais par la valeur des mandats(2), que les inégalités devant le succès électoral ne s'expliquent pas par le montant des dépenses de campagne mais par les résultats économiques des politiques publiques et le capital politique des candidats (3), et que l'action des groupes de pression ne remet pas en cause la sincérité du scrutin parce que le don ne doit pas simplement être pensé comme un acte d'investissement mais aussi comme un acte de consommation (4).

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00270469_v1.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published, Politiques et Management public, 2004, 25, décembre, 27-46
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00270469_v1

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Keywords: corruption; capital politique; monnaie; politique et finance publique;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Demsetz, Harold, 1982. "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 47-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lott, John R, Jr, 1987. "Licensing and Nontransferable Rents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 453-55, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-93, October.
  4. Palda, Kristian S, 1975. "The Effect of Expenditure on Political Success: Reply," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 779-80, December.
  5. Palda, Kristian S, 1975. "The Effect of Expenditure on Political Success," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 745-71, December.
  6. Morris Coats, R. & Dalton, Thomas R., 1992. "Entry barriers in politics and uncontested elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 75-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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