Guillaume Hollard () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) Stéphane Rossignol (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
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This paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his policy platform. This leads to a strikingly different model, in which all extreme voters support the favored candidate.
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Length: Date of creation: Jun 2008 Date of revision: Publication status: Published, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10, 3, 441-454 Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00267218_v1
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00267218/en/ Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
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