The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
AbstractBargaining theory has a conceptual dichotomy at its core: according to one view, the utilities in the bargaining problem are meaningless numbers (v-N.M utilities), while according to another view they do have concrete meaning (willingness to pay). The former position is assumed by the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, and the latter is assumed by the egalitarian, utilitarian, and equal-loss solutions. In this paper I describe a certain form of equivalence between the set consisting of the former solutions and the set consisting of the latter. This equivalence is the result of an attempt to bridge the gap between the aforementioned views; utilizing this equivalence, I derive a new axiomatization of the Nash solution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Haifa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number WP2012/1.
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2012
Date of revision: 06 Feb 2012
Bargaining; interpersonal utility comparisons; Nash solution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-04-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2012-04-23 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Geoffroy Clippel, 2007.
"An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 201-210, September.
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