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Paper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002-7.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2002-7

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1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   • Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Trade contests," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 317-334, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Moore, William J & Newman, Robert J & Turnbull, Geoffrey K, 2001. "Reputational Capital and Academic Pay," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 663-71, October.
6. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2000. "Strategic Restraint in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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