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Contests for Pricing Externalities with Free Entry of Injurers and Victims

Author

Listed:
  • McKitrick, R.

Abstract

Two methods for pricing an externality -taxes and strict liability- are modeled as lobbying contests with endogenous numbers of participants. In the tax contest, a regulator is susceptible to lobbying by polluters and victims. Under liability, the court's view is affected by legal representation.

Suggested Citation

  • McKitrick, R., 2000. "Contests for Pricing Externalities with Free Entry of Injurers and Victims," Working Papers 2000-3, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2000-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EXTERNALITIES ; LAW ; ENVIRONMENT ; TAXATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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