Contests for Pricing Externalities with Free Entry of Injurers and Victims
AbstractTwo methods for pricing an externality -taxes and strict liability- are modeled as lobbying contests with endogenous numbers of participants. In the tax contest, a regulator is susceptible to lobbying by polluters and victims. Under liability, the court's view is affected by legal representation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 2000-3.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
EXTERNALITIES ; LAW ; ENVIRONMENT ; TAXATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
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- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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