A guided tour to (real-life) social network elicitation
AbstractLimited attention has been devoted on how (real-life) social networks are elicited and mapped, even less from the viewpoint of mechanism design. This paper surveys the few mechanisms that have been proposed by the experimental literature to this purpose. These mechanisms differ in their incentive structure, as well as in the means of reward they employ. We compare these elicitation devices on the basis of the estimated di erences in the characteristics of the induced networks, such as the number of (mutual) links, correspondence and accuracy. Our main conclusion is that the elicited network architecture is itself dependent on the nature (and the structure) of the incentives. This, in turn, should provide the social scientist with guidelines on the most appropriate device to use, depending on the research objectives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 13/07.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Social Networks; Experimental Economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Pablo Branas-Garza & Ramon Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jimenez & Giovanni Pontiy, 2013. "A Guided Tour to (Real-Life) Social Network Elicitation," Working Papers 13-21, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2013-07-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-07-20 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2013-07-20 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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