Never retreat, never surrender: The bargaining power of commitment in the Hawk-Dove game
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More about this item
Keywords
Credible threats; negotiation; experiments;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2010-11-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-11-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-13 (Game Theory)
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