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Bounded Rationality

Author

Listed:
  • Coralio Ballester

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Penélope Hernández

    (Universidad de Valencia.)

Abstract

The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that employ different approaches for analyzing bounded rationality. The first is a spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their actions. The second framework elaborates on the relationship between irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 1995) as a device to explain this relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Coralio Ballester & Penélope Hernández, 2010. "Bounded Rationality," ThE Papers 10/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    • Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:10/10
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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